Ma`rifat Kalami

The issue of personal identity has occupied the minds of scholars for many years. To understand the nature of personal identity, several perspectives have been proposed, the most significant of which are the psychological continuity view and the non-physical substantial continuity view. Proponents of the psychological continuity view argue that our continuity involves a psychological relationship that can rely on various criteria such as memory, beliefs, recollections, and so on. Some empirical studies have suggested that ethics can also serve as a criterion for the realization of personal identity alongside these factors. Based on the acceptance of the psychological continuity view and considering these studies, ethics not only plays a role in the realization of personal identity but also ranks far above other criteria of psychological continuity, such as memory, perceptions, desires, and personality. In this paper, in addition to critiquing the psychological continuity view, we argue from the perspective of non-physical substantial continuity—the view we endorse—that the stable “self” is a non-material substance upon which all internal states, including ethics, depend. Therefore, ethics cannot constitute our philosophical identity.