Ma`rifat Kalami

Beliefs, as the fundamental foundations of religion, must be based on reasoning and certainty so that other religious teachings may rest upon firm convictions. For this reason, Islamic scholars have emphasized the necessity of certainty in the principles of faith. However, an examination of their views shows that only Ayatollah Qāḍī Ṭabāṭabāʾī and the late Muḥaqqiq Qummī have explicitly addressed the level of certainty required in the domain of beliefs. Using a descriptive–analytical method and a comparative study of the views of these two thinkers, the present research seeks to answer the question of whether attaining certainty in the strict sense (logical certainty) is necessary in the domain of beliefs, or whether lower degrees—such as certainty in the specific sense or certainty in the general sense (psychological certainty), or even customary certainty (including certainty obtained through imitation, taqlīd)—are sufficient. Qāḍī Ṭabāṭabāʾī emphasizes the necessity of certainty in the strict sense in matters of belief and does not consider imitation to be permissible, whereas Muḥaqqiq Qummī does not regard this level of certainty as necessary and considers inner reassurance (including firm conviction resulting from imitation) to be sufficient. It appears that logical certainty, although desirable and attainable by capable individuals, is not obligatory due to the impossibility of achieving this level of certainty in all doctrinal matters and because of differences in the capacities of religiously responsible individuals. Lower levels of certainty are therefore sufficient. Moreover, certain knowledge obtained through conscious imitation of experts constitutes a form of reasoning and possesses rational validity in the domain of beliefs.