Ma`rifat Kalami

The possibility of equating human mental phenomena with formal computer symbols, leading to a scientistic approach to computational data and the equivalence of their natures, is one of the most contentious issues arising from recent scientific and technological advancements, primarily highlighted by philosophers of mind. The resemblance of certain computer functions to human mental activities - such as consciousness, internal states, and volition - raises questions about the extent to which computer functions can approximate mindfulness or intelligence and whether artificial entities could achieve human-like intelligence. By analyzing the ontological reality of consciousness through Transcendent Philosophy (Ḥikmat al-Mutaʿāliyah) and explaining the scientific nature of computers and their data, this article comparatively evaluates these two domains. It concludes that, given the philosophical nature of human consciousness, the realization of consciousness and other mental phenomena in physical entities like hardware is logically impossible. Consequently, the Turing Test, which defends a scientistic approach to computers, cannot be deemed successful. John Searle’s "Chinese Room Argument" further supports this study’s argument.