Ma`rifat Kalami

The relationship between moral realism and the relationship of "ought and is" is one of the fundamental issues of metaethics. Meanwhile, the common reading of George Edward More introduces him as a denial of the inference of ought from is. George Warnock, in his critique of More, considers him to believe in the lack of connection between ought and is and seeks to prove this connection himself. The aim of this research is to comparative re-reading of Warnock and More's views in order to clarify their realist position towards the relationship of ought and is while criticizing the common interpretation of More's naturalistic fallacy. The research method is descriptive-analytical using library resources and analysis of original works. Warnock, by reviewing rationality and conditions for the general welfare, makes the relationship between facts and values. It is a common understanding, this article shows that while separating "good and bad" from "ought and ought not", he reduces the concept of "ought" to two issues of the type of "is", namely the causal-disabled proposition and the issue of inherent goodness, and as a result accepts the inference of ought from is. Both philosophers in moral realism, the logical relationship between ought and can be made, and the interpretation of Moore as the founder of the "ought and is fallacy" is incorrect.