Abstract:
One of the debating discussions among scholars is the "prior detailed knowledge of God" and its relationship with "human choice". Some followers of the "separation" school, who believe in the universal heterogeneousness of the creator and the creature and believe in the theory of "pure tanzih (God’s transcendence)" about God's attributes, have resorted to the theory of "knowledge without the known" to justify "the Divine knowledge and its relationship with human choice". One their arguments is that an optional act is unpredictable due to its optional nature, and therefore, the Divine knowledge cannot be similar to human knowledge and cannot be related to the known; and because the Divine knowledge is different from the knowledge that we find in ourselves, and the Divine knowledge has "nothing to do with what is known", "only transcendental propositions and reports may be said about this knowledge". This article shows that the theory of "unpredictability of optional acts" has many problems, the most important of which is the incorrect analysis of "the reality of option" and "its contradiction with necessity", using an analytical and descriptive method. Therefore, this argument of the separation school - in order to prove its views about "mere transcendence" and "knowledge without the known" - is invalid.