Ma`rifat-e Kalami, Volume 16, Issue 1, No 34, Year 2026, Pages 121-140
Denying the Genuineness of Religious Disagreements and the Epistemological Challenge of Disagreement
Article Type:
Research
Writers:
✍️ Ruhullah Mowahedi
/ Research Collaborator, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Imam Riḍā International Research Institute, Al-Muṣṭafā International University, Mashhad, Iran / r.mowahedi@gmail.com
/ Research Collaborator, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Imam Riḍā International Research Institute, Al-Muṣṭafā International University, Mashhad, Iran / r.mowahedi@gmail.com10.22034/kalami.2026.5002134⏳
Abstract:
Can adopting views that question the genuineness of religious
disagreements help resolve the skepticism arising from religious
disagreement and render us independent of examining the epistemic
foundations of this challenge? In response to this question, the present
paper examines three views that deny the genuineness of religious
disagreements by offering unconventional interpretations of the nature
of religious beliefs: (1) Religious non-cognitivism, which considers
disagreements in religious beliefs to be of the type of differences in
attitudes; (2) Religious relativism, which denies absolute truth in the
realm of religion; (3) Religious pluralism, which holds that seemingly
conflicting beliefs of religions can be simultaneously true. The paper
examines these three views and their degree of success in overcoming
the epistemological challenge of religious disagreement, arguing that
although accepting them may reduce some epistemological challenges
of religious disagreement, given the serious problems of these views,
they cannot be considered a suitable solution to this challenge.
چکیده و کلیدواژه فارسی (Persian)
Title :واقعی ندانستن اختلافنظرهای دینی و چالش معرفتشناختی اختلافنظر
Abstract:
آیا اتخاذ دیدگاههایی که واقعیبودن اختلافنظرهای دینی را زیرسؤال میبرند، میتواند به حل شکاکیت ناشی از اختلافنظر دینی کمک کرده و از بررسی بنیانهای معرفتی این چالش بینیازمان سازد؟ نوشتار حاضر در راستای پاسخ به این پرسش، به بررسی سه دیدگاهی پرداخته است که با ارائه تفاسیر غیرمعمول از ماهیت باورهای دینی، واقعیبودن اختلافنظرهای دینی را انکار میکنند: (1) ناشناختگرایی دینی که اختلاف باورهای دینی را از سنخ اختلاف در طرزتلقیها میداند؛ (2) نسبیگرایی دینی که به انکار حقیقت مطلق در عرصه دین میپردازد؛ و (3) تکثرگرایی دینی که به امکان صدق همزمان باورهای بهظاهر متعارض ادیان قائل است. نوشتار به بررسی این سه دیدگاه و میزان موفقیت آنها در غلبه بر چالش معرفتشناختی اختلافنظر دینی، میپردازد و استدلال میکند که هرچند پذیرش آنها میتواند برخی چالشهای معرفتشناختی اختلافنظر دینی را کاهش دهد، با توجه به مشکلات جدیای که با آن مواجهاند، نمیتواند راهحلی کارآمد برای این چالش قلمداد شود.
References:
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Mowahedi, Ruhullah. (2026) Denying the Genuineness of Religious Disagreements and the Epistemological Challenge of Disagreement. Ma`rifat-e Kalami, 16(1), 121-140 https://doi.org/10.22034/kalami.2026.5002134.
Ruhullah Mowahedi."Denying the Genuineness of Religious Disagreements and the Epistemological Challenge of Disagreement". Ma`rifat-e Kalami, 16, 1, 2026, 121-140
Mowahedi, R.(2026) 'Denying the Genuineness of Religious Disagreements and the Epistemological Challenge of Disagreement', Ma`rifat-e Kalami, 16(1), pp. 121-140
