Ma`rifat Kalami

The present study, employing an analytical-critical method, evaluates the controversy between the viewpoints of Richard Swinburne and Michael Martin regarding the validity of cosmological arguments with a probabilistic approach. Swinburne, expressing doubt about the efficacy of necessary deductive arguments, offers a probabilistic argument on the basis of which the "hypothesis of the existence of God," owing to its simplicity and greater explanatory power, enjoys a higher probability than other explanatory hypotheses of the universe. On the other hand, Michael Martin, by raising three detailed criticisms, calls this argument into question: ambiguity in the calculation of the prior probability of the complex universe, the unjustifiability of the principle of simplicity in preferring the divine hypothesis, and the indeterminacy of the probability of this universe being created by Him. This article, while presenting the views of both parties, demonstrates that Martin's criticisms are vulnerable in several respects: first, overlooking essential philosophical rules and the initial lack of need for probabilistic calculations; second, error in calculating the prior probability of the complex universe and other issues raised by Martin; third, fallacy in reasoning based on the principle of simplicity and an incorrect explanation regarding the existence or non-existence of God. In conclusion, it must be noted that although Swinburne's probabilistic argument may face challenges, Martin's criticisms have likewise failed to invalidate it.