Ma`rifat Kalami

This study employs a critical-analytical method to evaluate the confrontation between the views of Richard Swinburne and Michael Martin regarding the validity of cosmological arguments with a probabilistic approach. Swinburne, skeptical of the efficacy of deductive, necessary arguments, presents a probabilistic argument positing that the hypothesis of God's existence is more probable than alternative hypotheses in explaining our complex world, due to its greater simplicity and explanatory power. Martin challenges this argument with three main criticisms: the ambiguity in calculating the prior probability of a complex world, the unjustifiability of the principle of simplicity in preferring the theistic hypothesis, and the unknowability of the probability of God creating *this* particular world. This article, while presenting the positions of both sides, demonstrates that Martin's critiques suffer from several weaknesses: first, neglecting necessary philosophical principles and the initial lack of necessity for probabilistic calculation; second, errors in calculating the prior probability of a complex world and other related issues; third, fallacious reasoning regarding the principle of simplicity and an incorrect interpretation concerning the existence or non-existence of God. In conclusion, it must be noted that although Swinburne's probabilistic argument may face certain challenges, Martin's criticisms have not succeeded in refuting it.