Abstract:
The research problem of the present paper is: How is Christian belief in
essential impossibilities (impossible by essence) possible? Christianity
is built upon firm belief in matters such as the incarnation of God, His
suffering, death, and subsequent resurrection from the dead, and these
dogmatic beliefs that must be accepted unconditionally are called
“dogmas.” However, these matters are considered essential impossibilities
and impossible-by-essence. The research method of this paper is
descriptive-analytical of the critical analysis type, drawing on various
logical rules, whereby the meaningfulness of “essential impossibilities”
is analyzed. The most important finding of this paper is that essential
impossibilities lack a determinate concept in the mind and should be
regarded as “concept-semblances” (mafhūm-namā). After logically
proving this, it becomes clear that belief in an impossible-by-essence is, in
fact, belief without an object (muta‘allaq). Consequently, since one cannot
believe in “nothing,” one must assume that a Christian brings to mind an
image of a possible concept (a delusive and vague concept), believes in
it, incorrectly applies an impossible-by-essence title (e.g., the incarnation
of God) to that mental concept, and then claims to have believed in an
impossibility.